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Collective Reputation
with Stochastic Production and Unknown Willingness
to Pay for Quality
Abstract
In many cases consumers cannot observe a single firm’s investment
in environmental quality or safety, but only the average quality of
the industry. The outcome of the investment is stochastic since firms
cannot control perfectly the technology or external factors that may
affect production. In addition, firms do not know consumers’ valuation
of quality. We characterize the solution of the firms’ investment game
and show that the value of stopping investments when firms are already
investing in quality can be negative when the free-riding incentives
dominate. The existence of systematic uncertainty on the outcome of
investment slows down investment in quality, compared to a situation
without uncertainty. The uncertainty on consumers’ willingness to pay
for quality can speed up or slow down investment. We also obtain the
counterintuitive result that information acquisition may decrease the
overall level of quality.
J.E.L. Classification: C73, D92, Q52.
Keywords: collective reputation, dynamic game, real options, stochas-
tic quality.
1
1 Introduction
In markets where the consumer cannot trace the product to a specific pro-
ducer, consumer demand is based on average quality of the industry. All
producers will share a collective reputation of the good regardless of individ-
ual production quality.1 Sometimes, the consumer assesses products based on
a geographic “savoir-faire”, and demand is driven by such notions as Italian
shoes or Scottish whiskey. Agricultural markets, in particular, have many
examples of products that share a given location of production but where
the consumer cannot trace the specific product that is bought to a partic-
ular producer in the area, such as Florida grapefruits, Parmesan cheese or
Idaho potatoes. The European Protected Geographical Indication and Des-
ignation of Origin labels, as well as the state product labels in the U.S. are
all based on a common reputation for the product reflecting its origin and
use of a common input, such as “terroir” for French wines. But even beyond
agricultural markets, examples can be found in the case of industries where
reputation depends more on the intrinsic characteristics of the production
chain rather than on the individual behaviour, as is the case of the safety
reputation for the oil and gas industry. Consumer concern about oil extrac-
tion, for instance, seems to be more related to the technology itself rather
than to the reputation of a given supplier. Following industrial pollution in-
1This can be the case of experience goods, for which the consumer cannot assess quality
ex ante, but it can also be the case for credence goods (Darby and Karni, 1973), i.e., goods
for which quality characteristics depend on production processes that are difficult to verify.
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cidents, the entire industry gets tainted by a bad reputation and examples of
this are also common in the chemical industry (see Barnett and King, 2012).
In all these cases, there is a collective supply of some input (effort, feed-
stock, level of care, etc.) by all participants in the industry that generates
positive externalities for each firm in the industry. These externalities affect
firms’ returns, depending on consumers’ ability to effectively evaluate and
integrate into their own demand the consequences of firms’ investment. In
response to this problem, minimum quality standards can be implemented.
Such policy is common for products of the same geographic origin, such
as the designated origin labels. Inspection and monitoring costs as well as
moral hazard still impose limits on these solutions. Even if we assume perfect
compliance with a minimum quality standard, the question at hand is what
incentives do firms have to increase investment to go beyond the standard?
In the examples above, investments in quality accumulate over time.
The impact of investment on firms’ returns, however, can be assumed to
be stochastic for two main reasons. First, the outcome of the investment can
depend on the realization of some external factor that is not under control
of the single firm. This is the case of the protected designation of origin
labels, for which a disease or weather conditions might impact the quality
of the feedstocks. It might also be the case of a systemic event that affects
the industry’s reputation as regards safety or reliability. The second source
of uncertainty stems from the fact that investment is beneficial for the firms
only to the extent that consumers realize the positive improvement in qual-
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ity or safety. Since consumers cannot monitor actual quality investments,
they can only rely on their own valuation of quality, which may differ from
the actual level, and is unknown to the firms. As a result, we model firms’
investments as subject to uncertainty on consumers’ valuation of quality, in
addition to the uncertainty on the outcome of the investment.
The collective nature of production implies a classic free-riding problem
that may undermine investment in quality. We investigate, in a dynamic
game framework, whether firms would invest in quality in such a setting
and the factors that affect the investment decision. Moreover, assuming that
quality accumulation is good per se, we investigate under which conditions
releasing information on consumers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for quality,
i.e., reducing uncertainty on the demand side, allows firms to start a virtuous
circle of quality accumulation. Given the strategic interaction setting, when
the industry starts from a low level of quality accumulation (which might be
conceived as a baseline quality), investing in quality would raise the return
on investment but also increase the free-riding incentive. We characterize un-
der which conditions reducing uncertainty induces firms to invest in quality,
considering both the case in which firms may acquire information themselves
and when there is a third party that discloses the information to the firms.
Our main findings are the following: a) Since quality is a public good
for firms, free riding can delay quality accumulation. The value of stopping
the investments when firms are already investing in quality can be negative.
b) Without systemic uncertainty on quality, the game reduces to a standard
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investment decision and firms behave as if they were a single monopolist. c)
Consumers’ WTP for quality speeds up (delays) investments whenever con-
sumers’ preferences are positively (negatively) biased towards the industry.
The impact of consumers’ WTP is non-linear: there are positive returns of
consumers’ WTP on quality accumulation; there exists a threshold of quality,
however, such that whenever quality is below it firms never find it optimal to
invest in quality regardless of the WTP for quality. d) When quality is at a
low level it is never optimal for firms to acquire information about consumers’
WTP, regardless of the cost of doing so. e) An external body, or consortium,
would reduce the probability of firms investing in quality by disclosing in-
formation on consumers’ WTP. Interestingly enough, in an empirical study
of the wine industry, Castriota and Delmastro (2015) find that firms can be
stuck in a bad reputation - low quality trap. In a different theoretical setting,
our model supports this finding as a result of too low a quality standard set
by the external body or consortium.
The novelty of our paper is to model the interaction of two sources of
stochasticity in a dynamic game of collective good production: stochastic
quality accumulation and stochastic consumer valuation. The paper thus ex-
tends the existing literature on collective reputation, that has studied agricul-
tural commodities in particular, for which it is a frequent problem, and other
products that are not easily distinguishable ex ante (Winfree and McCluskey,
2005; McQuade, Salant and Winfree, 2016), but always in a deterministic
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framework.2 The model we develop extends the existing analysis by allowing
the quality level to be stochastic both in the level of the investment and in
the impact that quality has on firms’ demand.3 Some recent work studies the
interaction between individual and collective reputation (Costanigro, Bond
and McCluskey, 2012), which has been shown to be relevant empirically in
the sense that a stronger individual reputation makes the payoff to the collec-
tive reputation higher (Gergaud, Livat and Warzynski, 2012). Here we focus
on the dynamic game between firms and their collective production, in order
to have clear-cut results on the impact of the two sources of uncertainty on
the free-riding problem. With this limitation we obtain analytical results,
whereas Costanigro, Bond and McCluskey (2012) have to rely on numeri-
cal simulations. We share with Claude and Zaccour (2009) the specification
of how reputation shifts aggregate demand and the collective build-up of a
stock of quality. The novelty here is to introduce the stochastic nature of
quality. Recent work on stochastic quality, on the other hand, normally as-
sumes that a firm can signal the quality of its product (high or low) such
that its own reputation matters, not the collective reputation. In Board and
Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013) reputation is defined as consumers’ belief that the
2Levin (2009) introduced a stochastic version of the seminal Tirole (1996) model of
collective reputation where the workers’ cost of effort evolves randomly and there are noisy
signals of a worker’s type. In these models the workers’ types are imperfectly observed
and collective reputation arises through beliefs, and can be expressed as the fraction of
workers with good reputation. By comparison, there are no individual reputations in our
model and collective reputation is a pure public good.
3Static analyses by Fleckinger (2007), McQuade, Salant and Winfree (2016) and Rou-
vière and Soubeyran (2011) focus on the impact of market structure and of regulation,
such as minimum quality standards.
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product quality is high. Dilme (2014) and Bohren (2014) study the cumula-
tive effect of past investments on current quality in a stochastic game, but
also here, in a game between one firm and multiple consumers. Fishman et al.
(2014) provides a recent extension of a model with collective reputation and
updating of consumer beliefs. They introduce endogenous membership in a
collective brand, and show how branding can provide consumers with better
information and hence increase the incentives for the high quality firms to
invest. Our contribution is to explicitly consider the dynamic game between
firms. The novelty is to focus on the firms’ collective game and their incen-
tives to invest under two sources of uncertainty: stochastic production, and
uncertainty on consumers’ valuation of quality. On the other hand, we do not
allow firms to send signals to consumers through advertising and labelling,
since these approaches have been thoroughly explored in the literature (see
the survey by Dranove and Jin, 2010).
Methodologically, the paper that is the most closely related to ours is
Wirl (2008) who studies a continuous time stochastic dynamic game among
firms that create a stock externality that is subject to uncertainty over time.
By comparison to that model we share the context of a dynamic game among
firms but we develop the model to include aspects of information availability
that are absent in such dynamic games. In particular, we introduce uncer-
tainty also on consumers’ valuation of the quality of the good and analyse
the value to firms of acquiring that information as well as the impact of
information disclosure on the probability to invest in quality.
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The paper is structured as follows. The model is introduced in Section
2. Section 3 characterizes the solution to the firms’ quality investment game
in the benchmark case when there is no information on consumers’ valuation
of quality and compares it to the case of full information. In Section 4 we
investigate whether it is ex ante optimal to obtain information on consumers’
valuation of quality. We analyze two cases: the firm’s decision problem on in-
formation acquisition and the case of an external body that aims at increasing
aggregate quality by disclosing information. Conclusions and indications for
future research follow in Section 5. All proofs are presented in the Technical
Appendices.
2 The model
We consider a continuous time version of an industry composed of n > 1
risk-neutral identical firms that produce a good whose market price at time
t ≥ 0 is affected by the current level of reputation Rt of the industry as
a whole. That is, as in Winfree and McCluskey (2005) and Claude and
Zaccour (2009), the level of reputation determines the location of the demand
curve. We assume that, although the firms may invest in product quality to
increase their collective level of reputation, they are unable to assess exactly
how consumers value such an investment and convert product quality into
reputation.
We also make the following assumptions about the industry. Each firm
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produces one unit of output per unit of time to be sold in a market where
the price depends positively on the willingness to pay for aggregate quality
of the entire industry.4 Assuming consumers’ linear preferences, we use the
following inverse demand function:5
p(Rt) = at +Rt (1)
where at > 0 is an additive shock that accounts for the relative strength of
the market demand. This additive shock is assumed to be identically and
independently distributed (i.i.d.) over time with expected value E(at) = a.
Even if consumers are willing to pay a higher price for higher quality, firms
do not know their valuation ex ante. This relation is linear for simplicity:
Rt = (1 + θ)Qt (2)
where Qt is the aggregate stock of quality at time t ≥ 0 and θ is the un-
known time-invariant parameter that represents consumers’ specific WTP
for product quality. Since there should be no reason to suppose ex ante that
consumers have either positive or negative bias towards the quality of the en-
4We thus deliberatively abstract from firms’ other strategic interactions, such as the
quantity choice, in order to focus on the provision of quality as a collective good problem.
5For instance, we could assume, as in Claude and Zaccour (2009), a simple linear inverse
demand curve:
p = A+R− C(nq)
where p is the output price per unit, nq is the total output, A is an exogenous shock to
demand and C is a non-negative constant representing the slope of the linear demand
function. Setting a = A− C(nq) we would obtain the expression (1) in the text.
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tire industry, we assume that θ is distributed over the interval θ ∈ [−1,+1],
with density f(θ) and
∫ +1
−1 θf(θ)dθ = 0.
6
Each firm may improve the level of accumulated quality of the industry by
investing each time an amount kit, i = 1, 2...n, in quality. We assume that
the stock of quality evolves over time according to a geometric Brownian
motion which is common knowledge:
dQt =
(α
n
n∑
i=1
kit
)
Qtdt+ σQtdzt, with Qt=0 = Q (3)
where σ is the constant instantaneous volatility and dzt is the increment of
the standard Wiener process satisfying E0 [dzt] = 0, E0 [dz2t ] = dt.7 The
assumption of a Brownian motion is shared by several analyses of a single
firm’s investment problem (e.g., Faingold and Sannikov, 2011, Bohren, 2014).
In the context of agricultural goods, the quality process used here could be
interpreted as normalizing a minimum quality standard to zero, and analyze
whether firms have incentives to go beyond the minimum standard of quality.
We further use two simplifying assumptions: First, only a fraction α ∈
[0, 1] of new investment in quality accumulates over time. Second, the drift
term
(
α
n
∑n
i=1 kit
)
is a linear function of the average investment in quality
6The support of θ can be [θ−, θ¯] without affecting the results. But as seen from Equation
(2), as long as Qt > 0, Rt ≥ 0 if and only if θ− ≥ −1.
7Equation (3) implies that, starting from Q, the random position of the actual stock
Qt has a lognormal distribution, with mean lnQ+ (αn
∑n
i=1 kit − 12σ2)t, and variance σ2t.
Since the process is Markovian, at any point in time the value Qt observed by the firms is
the best predictor of the future stock of quality.
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at time t. The assumption on average industry quality is used also in a de-
terministic framework in Winfree and McCluskey (2005) and in McQuade,
Salant and Winfree (2016) who use a quantity-weighted average of the qual-
ities sold by the firms. This assumption is supported by the empirical work
by Landon and Smith (1997, 1998).
Substituting (2) in (1), for any given value of θ, the current price depends
on the stock of quality accumulated up to t, Qt, and the current shock at:
p(Qt, at; θ) = at + (1 + θ)Qt. (4)
From (4) it is evident that, as both at and Qt are stochastic the firms
cannot infer θ from observing the past relations of pt and Qt. Even though,
given the structure of the price, low realizations of pt for some high realiza-
tions of Qt could make firms more pessimistic about θ and vice versa, this
could be a temporary situation and therefore unable to provide information
on the true "long-term" WTP of consumers.8
In order to apply the real option approach to the investment decision, we
assume that each firm invests at a fixed level or does not invest at all, i.e.,
8Since pt, at and Qt are cointegrated, a sequential learning process could be set in the
following way: defining Xt ≡ pt−atQt , each firm observes over time a sequence of realizations
of a random variable Xt = (1 + θ) + εt, where εt is a sequence of "noise" terms. If εt
are independent and N(0, 1), by the strong law of large numbers, the value of θ would
eventually be revealed, i.e., almost surely limt→∞
∑
Xt/t → 1 + θ. This implies that
asymptotically a learning process would reveal the true value of θ. However, we are not
interested in this paper to evaluate the time asymptotically or studying how firms could
estimate θ in finite time. We simply assume that by paying φ firms can acquire in finite
time a knowledge of θ that all of them can fully rely on.
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kit ∈ {0, 1} , for all i and t ≥ 0. Therefore, at each point in time the firm
has the choice (strategy) to make a sunk investment in quality or not at cost
c(1) = c > 0 and c(0) = 0 respectively. This assumption is often used in
non-cooperative continuous time versions of the Rubinstein game and allows
to obtain a closed form solution of the investment process (Huisman, 2001;
Wirl, 2008, 2009).9
Finally, the analysis is conducted using feedback stationary Markov strate-
gies: kit = Ψi(Qt), for i = 1, 2...n, and t ≥ 0. This implies that the players’
actions at each period t depend only on the accumulated stock of quality up
to t, i.e., Qt is a sufficient statistic on the basis of which firms can condition
their investment decisions at time t. In addition the symmetry implies that
kit = Ψ(Qt) for all i and the best reply to Ψ−i is a Nash equilibrium. Note
that since the strategy equation is derived by the firm’s non-cooperative in-
tertemporal optimization (see Section 3 below), each firm behaves optimally
for all values of Qt regardless of whether this stock was on or off the equilib-
rium path (Basar and Olsder, 1995).10
9In order to make the model more realistic, we could also introduce quality depreciation,
for instance, by assuming that quality lifetime follows a Poisson process. This would mean
that, over any short period dt, there would be a given probability that Qt got reduced
or even completely cancelled. Since the effect of depreciation would make irreversibility
weaker, none of the results of the paper would be affected by such an assumption.
10It is worth to note that, even if it is not possible to exclude a priori the existence
of time-dependent Nash equilibria, stationary strategies are the ‘natural’ choice in this
context where firms are symmetric and invest a constant amount over time (Dangl and
Wirl, 2004).
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3 Incomplete information vs full information
Assuming profit maximizing behaviour, each firm chooses the level of invest-
ment in quality that maximizes the expected present value of its stream of
profits over time, subject to the state equation (3). In Section 3.1, we first
solve the firms’ problem with incomplete information. In Section 3.2, we
solve the problem under full information and compare the equilibrium with
information on consumers’ willingness to pay for quality and without.
3.1 Incomplete information
The incomplete information model is our benchmark model, in which we
assume that information on θ cannot be acquired neither ex ante nor ex post.
For negligible production costs, if we denote the discount rate by r > α, firm
i’s objective is:
Vi(Q) = max
kit∈{0,1}
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt[p(Qt, at; θ)− ckit]dt
]
for i = 1, 2...n (5)
such that (3) and (4) hold,
where E(.) is the expectation with respect to θ, {at, t ≥ 0 } and {Qt, t ≥ 0}
Since E(θ) = 0 and Equation (4) is linear, the problem (5) reduces to:
Vi(Q; 0) = max
kit∈{0,1}
E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt[p(Qt, a; 0)− ckit]dt
]
for i = 1, 2...n (6)
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where Vi(Q; 0) indicates the firm’s value without information on θ, p(Qt, a; 0) =
E(at) + (1 + E(θ))Qt, and E0(.) is the expectation taken at time t = 0 with
respect to {Qt, t ≥ 0}.11
By the linearity of (4), the sufficient condition for a stationary Markov
perfect equilibrium is given by the Bellman equation for the firm’s non-
cooperative intertemporal optimization:12
rVi = max
ki∈{0,1}
[
1
2
σ2Q2V ′′i +
α
n
(
ki +
n∑
j 6=i
kj
)
QV ′i + p(Q, a; 0)− cki
]
for i = 1, 2...n (7)
where V ′i and V ′′i stand for the first and second derivatives with respect to
Q respectively. Recall that because of the binary action space and firms’
homogeneity assumption, Vi = V for all i. Standard arguments lead to a
solution for (7) taking the following form (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, and
Technical Appendix A):
V (Q; 0) =
 V0(Q; 0) for Q < QˆV1(Q; 0) for Q > Qˆ
where V0(Q; 0) and V1(Q; 0) are the firm’s value when it is not investing
and when it is investing in quality respectively, and Qˆ is the stock of quality
11In our framework the absolute integrability condition E
[∫∞
0
e−rt | p(Qt, at; θ) | dt
]
<
∞ is satisfied by the assumption that r > α. (The proof is available from the authors
upon request.)
12From now onward we drop the time index for notational convenience, whenever it is
not explicitly needed.
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achieved by the industry that triggers the investment. If firms find themselves
in a range of quality such that Q < Qˆ, they would not invest in quality, i.e.,
would choose ki = 0. This simply means that the overall stock of quality
would evolve over time following a purely stochastic path with no drift term
(see Equation (3)). If, on the contrary, the overall level of quality was such
that Q > Qˆ, firms would find it optimal to invest, i.e., ki = 1. Recall that
the stochastic nature of Q is such that firms change their strategy whenever
Q crosses Qˆ. This might happen several times. In other words, even if firms
were in a region where they would find it optimal to invest in quality, it might
happen that at a certain point in time Q falls below Qˆ, which implies that
firms would stop investing (and vice versa).
If Qˆ exists, then by substituting the two strategies into the Bellman equa-
tion (7) the latter reduces to:
rV0 =
1
2
σ2Q2V ′′0 + p(Q, a; 0) for Q < Qˆ (8)
and
rV1 =
1
2
σ2Q2V ′′1 + αQV
′
1 + p(Q, a; 0)− c for Q > Qˆ (9)
Provided that r > α, solving the problem [8-9] yields the following:
Proposition 1 In the quality investment game, the following holds true:
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1) The investment rule is:
Qˆ =
(β1 − γ2) rnα − γ2β1
(β1 − γ2)− β1(γ2 − 1) αr−α
c > 0 (10)
2) The value of the firm is:
V (Q; 0) =
 A0Q
β1 + a+Q
r
for Q < Qˆ
B1Q
γ2 + a
r
+ Q
r−α − cr for Q > Qˆ
(11)
where:
A0 =
[
nc
α
− Qˆ
r
]
Qˆ−β1
β1
> 0 (12)
and
B1 =
[
nc
α
− Qˆ
r − α
]
Qˆ−γ2
γ2
=
 > 0 if β1 < n/(n− 1)≤ 0 if β1 ≥ n/(n− 1) (13)
and: β1 = 12 +
√
(1
2
)2 + 2r
σ2
> 1, γ2 = (12 − ασ2 )−
√
(1
2
− α
σ2
)2 + 2r
σ2
< 0.
Proof. See Technical Appendix A
The interpretation of the value of the firm in Equation (11) is straightfor-
ward. In the range where Q < Qˆ, the term a+Q
r
indicates the present value
of selling the output when each firm is not investing in quality, while A0Qβ1
is the increment in a firm’s value due to the opportunity to invest in quality
in the future. This latter term is always positive as it accounts for two posi-
tive effects: 1) the benefits that each firm receives by its own investment in
quality and 2) the benefits each firm expects to obtain by the rivals’ future
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investment in quality. In the quality-investment game that firms are playing,
the usual prisoners’ dilemma trade-off applies. On the one hand, investing in
quality is positive since it increases revenues, but on the other hand each firm
is tempted to free ride on the others, given the positive industry spillovers.
In a static game, each player, expecting the free-riding behaviour of the other
firms, could anticipate the rivals’ moves choosing not to undertake its own
investment. However, in our dynamic setting this course of action is neu-
tralized by the firms’ decision to wait longer before investing in order to be
assured that it is worthwhile doing it once and for all. Moreover, by inspect-
ing the proof (See Technical Appendix A), we can see that ∂Qˆ
∂n
> 0. This
is also an interesting result that is coherent with our interpretation. The
higher the number of firms in the game, the higher the risk of free riding
and therefore the more the firms wait in order to be sure that there would
be no such free riding. In the range where Q > Qˆ, the term a
r
+ Q
r−α − cr
represents the present value of selling the output when each firm commits to
invest forever, while B1Qγ2 is the value to suspend investment in the future.
While in general it is true that the opportunity to suspend investment adds
value to the firms (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, ch.8) since it allows to avoid fixed
costs, in our case, when the quality falls, this term can become negative.13
The interpretation of this result is as follows: if there were no option to stop
investing, the value of the firm would be given by just a
r
+ Q
r−α − cr . However,
13Interestingly enough, such a result is similar to the one obtained by Wirl (2008) in
his study of a dynamic game among firms contributing to the same aggregate externality
(Wirl, 2008, Proposition 6, p. 108).
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the option to stop investing is coupled with the free-riding problem. When
Q > Qˆ, firms are investing, and therefore the negative spillover generated
by the free-riding problem could be so harsh that it may depress the firms’
value. This would occur because the potential cost savings stemming from
the option to stop investing could be outweighed by the costs spurred by the
lack of enforcement of the collective decision. As stated in the Proposition
this effect would be particularly important when the number of firms (which
is a proxy for the dimension of the industry) is high, i.e., β1 ≥ n/(n− 1).
Corollary. When σ vanishes, the game reduces to a standard investment
decision in which firms invest provided that marginal revenue covers marginal
cost.
The intuition of this result is the following. The investment rule in (10)
can be rewritten as:
Qˆ =
(β1−γ2)
γ2β1
rn
α
− 1
(β1−γ2)
γ2β1
− α
r−α +
β1
β1γ2
α
r−α
c > 0
Since both limσ→0 (β1−γ2)γ2β1 = limσ→0
β1
γ2β1
= 0, the above trigger becomes:
αQˆ
∣∣
σ=0
= (r − α)c (14)
Equation (14) has a very natural interpretation. When uncertainty on
quality vanishes, the n firms, being all equal, behave as if they were a single
monopolist. The left-hand side indicates the value of the marginal unit of
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investment by this monopolist; the right-hand side is the user-cost of this
unit. The evolution ofQ becomes perfectly predictable and the firms’ optimal
investment rule reduces to the Marshallian rule, i.e., invest as long as the
marginal revenue covers the marginal cost.
By comparing Qˆ to the trigger that arises when there is no game, i.e.,
under no uncertainty on quality, we can see that the trigger for investment
under uncertainty is higher: Qˆ−Qˆ
∣∣
σ=0
> 0. This implies that the opportunis-
tic free-riding behaviour induces firms to postpone the investment decision
compared to the case without uncertainty on the aggregate stock of quality,
in which firms behave as a monopolist.
3.2 Full information
Consider now the case of full information, i.e., firms can acquire the infor-
mation on consumers’ WTP for quality (θ) without paying any cost. In such
a setting, by firms’ homogeneity, Equation (5) becomes:
Vi(Q; θ) = max
kit∈{0,1}
E0
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt[p(Qt, a; θ)− ckit]dt
]
for i = 1, 2...n (15)
where p(Qt, a; θ) = E(at) + (1 + θ)Qt, and E0(.) is the expectation taken at
time t = 0 with respect to {Qt, t ≥ 0} . From (15) it is easy to prove that:
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Proposition 2 Under full information, 1) The optimal trigger is:
Q˜ =
Qˆ
(1 + θ)
(16)
2) and the value of the firm becomes:
V (Q; θ) =
 A˜0Q
β1 + a+(1+θ)Q
r
for Q < Q˜
B˜1Q
γ2 + a
r
+ (1+θ)Q
r−α − cr for Q > Q˜
(17)
where:
A˜0 =
[
nc
α
− Q˜
r
]
Q˜−β1
β1
and B˜1 =
[
nc
α
− Q˜
r − α
]
Q˜−γ2
γ2
(18)
Proof. Straightforward from Technical Appendix A
Note that the firms’ value function described above (17) maintains the
same structure and characteristics of the case discussed above. In particular,
the option value of investing (A˜0) and of halting investment (B˜1) can be
negative or positive, according to the parameters of the game. In addition,
by (16), it is immediate to show that:
Q˜ ≥ Qˆ for θ ∈ [−1, 0]
Q˜ < Qˆ for θ ∈ (0,+1]
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This implies that the information on consumer WTP for quality (θ) may
foster investment in quality compared to the case when there is no informa-
tion acquisition, i.e., Q˜ < Qˆ, if the unknown parameter for consumer WTP
for quality is such that, once revealed, it shows a positive bias in consumers’
valuation of quality, i.e., if θ > 0. On the contrary, the information on θ
might slow down the investment in quality, i.e., Q˜ > Qˆ, if it is revealed that
consumers’ WTP is lower than its expected value, i.e., if θ < 0. Obviously, it
is never optimal to invest in quality if the WTP for quality by consumers is
the worst possible one, θ → −1 (i.e. A˜0 = 0 and Q˜ =∞). Figure 1 describes
the difference in terms of the stock of quality that triggers the investment in
quality with information compared to the case when there is no information
acquisition, as a function of consumers’ valuation (θ).
We can see in Figure 1 that the trigger of the investment in the full
information case coincides with the one for the no information case only
if consumers have no bias (either positive or negative) in their valuation of
quality, i.e., θ = 0. On the contrary, a positive (negative) bias induces firms to
invest earlier (later), as expected. The trigger has a lower boundary when the
parameter θ is positive, due to the lowest boundary of any investment trigger,
namely Qˆ
2
. Given the structure of the game, when the accumulated quality
level is low (below Qˆ
2
), the positive spillover of the quality is so low that firms
find it optimal not to invest in quality even if they knew that consumers
have the highest possible valuation of their investment. On the contrary, a
negative bias in consumers’ valuation delays the investment decision even if
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Figure 1: Q˜ as a function of θ
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the aggregate quality level is extremely high. In the extreme case, for a fully
negative bias firms would never invest. In fact, it is as if firms’ investment
decisions were penalized more by a negative bias on behalf of consumers
towards their quality than by a positive one, which might induce a more
cautious behaviour by firms.14
4 Information acquisition and disclosure
We have considered so far the firms’ optimal choice of investing in quality for
the case of non observable marginal value of quality and perfectly observable
marginal value of quality, respectively. We study now whether obtaining
information on consumers’ willingness to pay (θ) by either acquiring it or
having it revealed by a trustworthy third party can start firms’ quality ac-
cumulation, whenever its level is so low and the free-riding incentive so high
that it impedes investing in quality. On the basis of the result shown above,
this translates into considering the optimal investment problem under uncer-
tainty for aggregated quality levels below Qˆ
2
. We consider two cases. First,
the information on θ can be acquired by firms themselves by paying each a
fee φ. Given that we intend to focus on the choice to acquire information per
se, and do not want to mix the investment choice with other possible gaming
behaviour, we assume that no free riding is possible in the information acqui-
14This result agrees with Bernanke’s (1983) Bad News Principle, for which relative
uncertainty asymmetrically influences firms’ decision processes, since unfavourable events
have a higher impact on investment decisions than favourable ones.
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sition choice. We show below that the existence of the fee is not crucial for
the results. Second, we consider the impact that free information disclosure
to firms can have on the probability of starting quality accumulation. This
case can be interpreted as the case of a consortium of the industry that could
credibly certify the veracity of the information.
4.1 Firms’ information acquisition
Consider the case of costly information acquisition. We assume that firms can
choose when to acquire the information. That is to say, firms are producing
and investing without knowing θ and ask themselves if there is a level of
quality QT (i.e., a learning time T ), such that it is worthwhile spending φ
to gain information on θ. There exist therefore two triggers that have to be
compared: one is the trigger of the investment choice without knowing θ and
the other one is the trigger of the information acquisition choice. The first
is still Qˆ and call the second QI . As explained before, we consider only the
case where QI ∈ [Q, Qˆ). Let us define the value of the firm with information
acquisition15 at t = 0 as:
E0
[∫ T
0
e−rt[p(Qt, a; 0)− ckit]dt+
∫ ∞
T
e−rt[p(Qt, a; θ)− ckit]dt− e−rTφ
]
i.e.,
Vi(Q; 0) + E0
[
e−rT [(V (QT ; θ)− V (QT ; 0)− φ)]
]
15We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this.
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Since ex-ante θ is not known and we are looking for QT in the range (0, Qˆ),
we can take the expected value with respect to θ:
Vi(Q; 0) + E0
[
(Eθ [V (QT ; θ)]− V (QT ; 0)− φ) e−rT
]
(19)
Maximizing Equation (19) with respect to T is equivalent to maximizing
the term between square brackets, that can be interpreted as the value of
information acquisition (Murto, 2014):
I(Q) = max
T
E0
[
(Eθ [V (QT ; θ)]− V (QT ; 0)− φ) e−rT
]
(20)
The firms’ problem will consist of finding the time T that maximizes I(Q).
T , the optimal learning time, is defined as:
T (Q) = inf
{
t ≥ 0 | QT = QI , and Eθ [V (QI ; θ)]− V (QI ; 0) = φ+ I(QI)
}
(21)
By direct inspection of (21), we can see that it is not necessarily optimal
to buy the information on θ immediately even if φ = 0. Even if information
acquisition was costless, the opportunity cost represented by the option to
wait I(Q) may induce the firms to wait longer before deciding to discover
the true value of θ. Once θ is known the real trigger is Q˜, which can be much
higher than Qˆ. Thus, when the current status of quality Q is very far from
Q˜ the value of information is negative and the firms delay the moment at
which information acquisition is worthwhile.
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The solution of problem (20) can be summarized as:
Proposition 3 If the trigger of the information acquisition QI exists, it
belongs to the interval [ Qˆ
2
, Qˆ).
Proof. See Technical Appendix B
We stress that the result of Proposition 3 is independent of the cost of
acquiring information (φ). Firms find themselves in a low-quality trap: when
the initial level of quality is low, i.e., below Qˆ
2
, they are locked in a period
of inertia in which they do not find it optimal to acquire information even if
it were costless to do so. Therefore, firms would not undertake any effort to
get to know consumers’ WTP for quality when the initial level of quality is
too low. This resembles the bad reputation trap of Castriota and Delmastro
(2015).
4.2 The Consortium’s information disclosure choice
The result of the previous section is particularly interesting from the per-
spective of a consortium, or industrial association, that knows that firms
are trapped and aims at maximizing the probability of quality investment
by its members. Examples include the case of consortia that are formed
as public entities with a formal mandate to guarantee members’ quality on
behalf of consumers, as is the case of agricultural producer organizations
(Bouamra-Mechemache and Zago, 2015; Zago, 1999),16 or consortiums such
16Originally introduced in 1996 in the fruit and vegetable sector (Council Regulation
2200/96), the EU Regulation 1308/2013 extended the use of Producer Organisations to
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as the parmesan cheese consortium (Consorzio Parmigiano Reggiano). An-
other example of more voluntary character is the initiative of trade associ-
ations created to foster common quality and safety standards, such as Re-
sponsible Care in the chemical industry (King and Lenox, 2000). Thus, we
consider here the case of an external body that maximizes the probability
that the firms invest in quality by finding the optimal release time for the
information.
Let P˜
(
Q˜(θ);Q
)
and Pˆ
(
Qˆ;Q
)
be the probabilities of investing when θ
is revealed and when it is unknown, respectively. In other words, starting
at Q in the interior of the range (0, Q˜(θ)] and (0, Qˆ], P˜ and Pˆ indicate
the probability that the stock of quality reaches the triggers Q˜(θ) and Qˆ,
respectively. Obviously, Pˆ
(
Qˆ;Q
)
< 1 when Q < Qˆ and Pˆ
(
Qˆ;Q
)
= 1 for
Q ≥ Qˆ.
We suppose that the consortium does not know θ but can acquire in-
formation on consumers’ WTP for quality and reveal it immediately to the
firms.17 As our objective is not to model the consortium’s welfare function,
we assume that the benefit of early investment in quality is always higher
than the cost of acquiring information and communicating it to the firms.
The consortium has to decide the optimal time to acquire the information,
i.e., whether it is best to acquire the information right away and reveal it to
all agricultural sectors.
17We do not allow firms to know ex ante that the consortium has the possibility to release
such information - in other words, no signalling game is allowed between the consortium
and the firms. We also assume that once the information is acquired it is immediately
visible to all firms.
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all members, or wait for firms to invest in quality by themselves and then
disclose the information on θ. Hence, the consortium’s problem consists of
identifying the stock Q that maximizes the following difference:18
∆(P (Q)) =
∫ θ˜(Q)
−1 P˜
(
Q˜(θ);Q
)
f(θ)dθ +
∫ +1
θ˜(Q)
1f(θ)dθ − Pˆ
(
Qˆ;Q
)
for Q < Qˆ
(22)
where θ˜(Q) = Qˆ
Q
− 1. We can claim the following
Proposition 4 It is never (strictly) optimal to disclose the information on
θ. (The consortium would be indifferent to do so only when Q = Qˆ
2
.)
Proof. See Technical Appendix C
The above proposition clearly shows that for the consortium it is never
optimal to acquire and disclose the information on consumers’ WTP for qual-
ity. In fact, it is always strictly worse, in the sense that the probability of
investing in quality, once the information is revealed, is lower for all possible
levels of accumulated quality, with just one specific exception, namely, that
exact level of quality for which it would be indifferent to reveal the infor-
mation since it would have no impact on the probability of early investment
in quality. The rationale of such a result is the following. When firms are
already investing in quality, there is no point in revealing information that
might just do harm, in the sense of inducing firm to stop investing should
they come to know that they have adopted quality too early. What about
18For coherence with the preceding section, we consider only the case of Q < Qˆ. Propo-
sition 4 holds also for Q > Qˆ as proved in Fontini et al. (2013).
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when firms are not investing? If Q is too low, i.e., below Qˆ
2
, it is not optimal
to disclose information since this would not induce any change in investment
strategy. Therefore, it might be optimal to disclose information only when
quality is in the range for which firms might find it profitable to invest, i.e.,
when Qˆ
2
≤ Q. Recall that there would be early investment in quality only if
θ was in the range for which it delivered "good news", in the sense that once
discovered θ happened to be larger than its expected value. On the contrary,
it would yield "bad news" if it was lower than 0. Recall that, without any
information, the firm would invest at Q = Qˆ. Let Q be in the range of
Qˆ
2
≤ Q < Qˆ. As Q reaches Qˆ from below, the set of possible good news,
which would induce early investment in quality, namely, those values of θ
included in the range 0 < θ < θ(Q), shrinks compared to the set of bad
news. In other words, as Q reaches the investment trigger, firms are getting
closer to the moment in which they would start investing anyhow. Revealing
consumer WTP for quality would therefore do only harm to early investment
in quality, because the set of possible results of the information disclosure
on the basis of which the firms would postpone their investment decision
becomes relatively larger than the set of those cases in which they would an-
ticipate the investments. Obviously, with θ symmetrically distributed, there
is just one value of Q for which those sets are equivalent, that is, when the
level of quality is at Q = Qˆ
2
.
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5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
We set up a model of collective production of quality where firms face two
sources of randomness: one related to the overall level of quality, because of
the occurrence of random events that affect production, and the other related
to uncertainty on consumers’ true willingness to pay for quality. The model
aims at capturing a situation where what matters for firms is not just their
own actual investment but also other firms’ investment and the willingness
to pay by consumers for aggregate quality when consumers cannot separately
assess the quality of each firm.
First we analyze the firms’ optimal choice of investment in quality without
information on consumers’ valuation of industry quality and determine the
option value related to its investment in quality. There are two opposing
effects at work: on the one hand the positive impact on demand of consumers’
willingness to pay for aggregate quality gives incentives for investment in
quality, on the other hand free riding among firms makes a firm wait until
going ahead with its investment. A positive option value exists depending on
which effect prevails. Second, we analyze whether relieving the uncertainty on
consumers’ willingness to pay for quality fosters quality accumulation. This
is done first by investigating whether firms themselves have an incentive to
acquire this information, when the initial situation is one of low aggregate
quality. We show that it is never optimal for a firm to invest in acquiring
this information regardless of its cost. We then go onto investigate whether
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a third party, such as a public body or industry consortium, can increase the
probability of investment in quality when firms are not investing in quality.
We show that even if the information disclosure were costless it would have
a negative impact on the probability of early investment in quality by the
firms. Information disclosure is more likely to do harm to quality investment
in the sense that it would induce firms to wait longer than they would without
information on consumers’ willingness to pay for quality.
The latter result has an interesting policy implication. When industry
quality starts from a low level, or the quality standard is set at a low level,
firms are trapped in an inertia area in which quality evolves over time on
a purely random basis: only a positive random shift of quality that is high
enough would induce firms to start investing themselves in quality. In such a
setting, a policy of reducing uncertainty on consumers’ willingness to pay for
quality would not be effective. A consortium or a producer organization that
aims at stimulating quality accumulation would be more effective if it invested
directly in quality, or obtained subsidies for financing firms’ investments.
Notice, however, that information disclosure might have a positive impact
from a social welfare point of view. This happens when consumers’ perception
of quality is close to -1 (the lowest possible), in which case the investment
in quality would be pointless (since it would never be perceived as such from
consumers). Therefore, revealing the true θ might be regarded as positive
since it would put an end to fruitless investments.19
19We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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Our results depend on the following assumptions: the stochastic evolution
of quality over time is a random walk, and the distribution of willingness to
pay for quality has zero mean. Far from being ad hoc assumptions, we believe
that they allow us to develop the model through a neutral and meaningful set
up, which does not introduce any artificial exogenous bias on the willingness
to pay for quality by consumers, on the one hand, and which guarantees
that quality can be accumulated only by means of deliberate action by firms
through investment, on the other hand. The latter assumption, in particular,
seems to describe well those situations of collective reputation building, like
the protected geographical labels that we referred to in the introduction.
The model is only a first attempt at investigating the role of information
in the framework of stochastic evolution of quality. Alternative modelization
of quality could be explored, for example, how firms’ investment decisions
change when their action may reduce the variance of quality, instead of the
average level of quality as in the present model. We leave such extensions to
future research.
6 References.
Barnett, M.L., King, A.A., 2012. Good Fences Make Good Neighbours:
A Longitudinal Analysis of an Industry Self-Regulatory Institution. The
Academy of Management Journal 51(6): 1150-1170.
Basar, T., Olsder, G.J., 1995. Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory,
32
2d ed. Academic Press, San Diego.
Bernanke, B.S., 1983. Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Cyclical Invest-
ment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 98(1): 85-106.
Board, S., Meyer-ter-Vehn, M., 2013. Reputation for Quality. Economet-
rica 81(6): 2381-2462.
Bohren, J.A., 2014. Stochastic Games in Continuous Time: Persistent
Actions in Long-Run Relationships. Working Paper, University of Pennsyl-
vania.
Bouamra-Mechemache, Z., Zago, A., 2015. Introduction: Collective Ac-
tion in Agriculture. European Review of Agricultural Economics 42(5): 707-
711.
Castriota, S., Delmastro, M., 2015. The Economics of Collective Rep-
utation: Evidence from the Wine Industry. American Journal Agricultural
Economics 97(2): 469-489.
Claude D., Zaccour, G., 2009. Investment in Tourism Market and Repu-
tation. Journal of Public Economic Theory 11(5): 797-817.
Costanigro, M., Bond, C.A., McCluskey, J. J., 2012. Reputation Leaders,
Quality Laggards: Incentive Structure in Markets with Both Private and
Collective Reputations. Journal of Agricultural Economics 63(2): 245-264.
Cox, D.R., Miller, H.D., 1965. The Theory of Stochastic Processes. Chap-
man and Hill, London.
Dangl, T., Wirl, F., 2004, Investment under Uncertainty: Calculating
the Value Function when the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–equation Cannot
33
be Solved Analytically. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 28:
1437-1460.
Darby, M.R., Karni, E., 1973. Free Competition and the Optimal Amount
of Fraud. Journal of Law and Economics 16(1), 67-88.
Dilme, F., 2014. Reputation Building through Costly Adjustment. Work-
ing Paper, University of Pennsylvania.
Dixit, A., Pindyck, R.S., 1994. Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton
University Press, Princeton.
Dranove, D., Jin, G.Z., 2010. Quality Disclosure and Certification: The-
ory and Practice. Journal of Economic Literature 48(4): 935-963.
Faingold, E., Sannikov, Y., 2011. Reputation in Continuous-Time Games.
Econometrica 79(3): 773-876.
Fishman, A., Finkelstein, I., Simhon, A., Yacouel, N., 2014. The Eco-
nomics of Collective Brands. Working Paper, The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem.
Fleckinger, P., 2007. Collective Reputation and Market Structure: Reg-
ulating the Quality vs Quantity Trade-Off. Working Paper, Ecole Polytech-
nique Cahier no. 2007-26.
Fontini, F., Millock, K., Moretto, M., 2013. Investments in Quality, Col-
lective Reputation and Information Acquisition. FEEM Working Paper 53.
2013.
Gergaud, O., Livat, F., Warzynski, F., 2012. Collective Reputation Ef-
fects: An Empirical Appraisal. Working Paper, Kedge Bordeaux Business
34
School.
Harrison, J. M., 1985. Brownian Motion and Stochastic Flow Systems.
Wiley, New York.
Huisman, K., 2001. Technology Investment: A Game Theoretic Real Op-
tion Approach. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht.
King, A.A., Lenox, M.J., 2000. Industry Self-Regulation without Sanc-
tions: The Chemical Industry’s Responsible Care Program. The Academy of
Management Journal 43(4): 698-716.
Landon, S., Smith, C.S., 1997. The Use of Quality and Reputation In-
dicators by Consumers: The Case of Bordeaux Wine. Journal of Consumer
Policy 20(3): 289-323.
Landon, S., Smith, C.S., 1998. Quality Expectations, Reputation and
Price. Southern Economic Journal 64(3): 628-647.
Levin, J., 2009. The Dynamics of Collective Reputation. The B.E. Jour-
nal of Theoretical Economics - Contributions 9(1): Article 27.
McQuade, T., Salant, S.W., Winfree, J.A., 2016. Markets with Untrace-
able Goods of Unknown Quality: Beyond the Small-Country Case. Journal
of International Economics 100: 112-119.
Murto, P., 2004. Valuing Options to Learn: Optimal Timing of Informa-
tion Acquisition. Paper presented at Real Options 2004.
Rouvière, E., Soubeyran, R., 2011. Competition vs. Quality in an Indus-
try with Imperfect Traceability. Economics Bulletin 31: 3052-3067.
Tirole, J., 1996. A Theory of Collective Reputation (with Applications
35
to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality). Review of Economic
Studies 63(1): 1-22.
Winfree J. A., McCluskey, J. J., 2005. Collective Reputation and Quality.
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 87 (1): 206-213.
Wirl, F., 2008. Tragedy of the Commons in a Stochastic Game of a Stock
Externality. Journal of Public Economic Theory 10(1): 99-124.
Wirl F., 2009. Non-cooperative Investment in Partnerships and their
Termination. Central European Journal of Operations Research 17(4): 479-
494.
Zago, A., 1999. Quality and Self-Regulation in Agricultural Markets:
How do Producer Organisations Make the Rules? European Review of Agri-
cultural Economics 26(2): 199-218.
36
A Technical Appendix A
The general solution to the differential equations (8) and (9) takes the form:20
V0(Q; 0) = A0Q
β1 +B0Q
β2 +
a+Q
r
for Q < Qˆ
and
V1(Q; 0) = A1Q
γ1 +B1Q
γ2 +
a
r
+
Q
r − α −
c
r
for Q > Qˆ
where β1, γ1 > 1 and β2, γ2 < 0 are the roots of the characteristic equations
Φ(β) = 1
2
σ2β(β−1)−r = 0 and Φ(γ) = 1
2
σ2γ(γ−1)+αγ−r = 0 respectively.
A0, B0, A1, B1 are four constants to be determined. Note that under Q < Qˆ
the first and second terms stand for the value of the option to switch to
investment. However, since the value of the option vanishes as Q → 0, we
set B0 = 0. Similarly, under Q > Qˆ the option to suspend investment is
valueless as Q → ∞ and then we set A1 = 0. To find the constants A0, B1
and the optimal trigger Qˆ we impose a matching value condition and smooth
pasting at Qˆ:
A0Qˆ
β1 +
a+ Qˆ
r
= B1Qˆ
γ2 +
a
r
+
Qˆ
r − α −
c
r
(23)
A0β1Qˆ
β1−1 +
1
r
= B1γ2Qˆ
γ2−1 +
1
r − α (24)
20See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chapters 6 and 7) for a thorough discussion.
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and the incentive constraint21
A0β1Qˆ
β1 +
Qˆ
r
=
c
α− αn−1
n
(25)
Solving the system [23-25] yields the following:
Qˆ =
(β1 − γ2) rnα − γ2β1
(β1 − γ2)− β1(γ2 − 1) αr−α
c > 0 (26)
and:
Aˆ0 =
[
nc
α
− Qˆ
r
]
Qˆ−β1
β1
Bˆ1 =
[
nc
α
− Qˆ
r − α
]
Qˆ−γ2
γ2
21This condition follows from the maximization of Equation (7). Each firm i will invest
k = 1 if
1
2
σ2Q2V ′′+
α
n
1 + n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj
QV ′+p(Q; 0)−c ≥ 1
2
σ2Q2V ′′+
α
n
 n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj
QV ′+p(Q; 0)
which at Qˆ , reduces to
α
n
1 + n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj
 QˆV ′ − c = α
n
 n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj
 QˆV ′
QˆV ′ =
c
α
n
1 + n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj
− α
n
 n∑
j=1,j 6=i
kj

Then by symmetry we obtain
QˆV ′ = c
α− αn−1n
The marginal gain of investing one more unit in quality should be equal to the marginal
cost.
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Then, the condition for A0 > 0 is Qˆ < n rαc, or
(β1−γ2) rnα −γ2β1
(β1−γ2)−β1(γ2−1) αr−α
< n r
α
, which
can be simplyfied into −γ2 < −(γ2−1) nrr−α , which is always satisfied. On the
other hand, the condition for B1 > 0 is Qˆ > n r−αα c, or
(β1−γ2) rnα −γ2β1
(β1−γ2)−β1(γ2−1) αr−α
>
n r−α
α
, which can be simplified into γ2α(β1(n − 1) − n) > 0; this is satisfied
for β1 < n/(n− 1).
Q.E.D.
B Technical Appendix B
Let us calculate Eθ [V (Q; θ)]−V (Q; 0). In particular, since (16) is monotonic,
we write:
Eθ [V (Q; θ)]− V (Q; 0) =
∫ θ˜(Q)
−1 V0(Q; θ)f(θ)dθ +
∫ +1
θ˜(Q)
V1(Q; θ)f(θ)dθ − V0(Q; 0) Qˆ2 < Q < Qˆ∫ +1
−1 V0(Q; θ)f(θ)dθ − V0(Q; 0) for Q < Qˆ2
(27)
where θ˜(Q) = Qˆ
Q
− 122. The first line of Equation (27) shows that, for any
given stock Q, the ex-ante value Eθ [V (Q; θ)] is formed by two terms. The
22To be precise, since dQ˜(θ)dθ < 0 for all θ ∈ [−1,+1], by inverting (16) we get:
θ˜(Q) =

−1 when Q˜(−1) =∞
Qˆ
Q − 1 for Qˆ2 < Q <∞
+1 Q ≤ Q˜(+1) = Qˆ2
39
first integral indicates the firm’s value when the revealed value of θ is so low
that it is not optimal to invest in quality, while the second integral reflects
the case where θ is found sufficiently high to induce the firm to invest in
quality.
Assuming that there exists a value QI ∈ [Q, Qˆ] beyond which each firm
decides to coordinate spending on acquiring information on θ, the solution
of (20) must solve the following Bellman equation:
rI =
1
2
σ2Q2I ′′ for Q < QI < Qˆ (28)
where I ′ and I ′′ stand for the first and second derivatives with respect to Q
respectively. The general solution for I takes the form:
I(Q) = M0Q
β1 +M1Q
β2 for Q < QI
where β1 > 1 and β2 < 0 are the roots of the characteristic equations Φ(β) =
1
2
σ2β(β − 1) − r = 0. However, since the value of the option to acquire the
information vanishes as Q→ 0 we set M1 = 0.
Assume φ ≥ 0. To find the constant M0 and the optimal trigger QI we
impose a matching value condition and smooth pasting at QI . Using (27),
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we have
M0Q
β1
I =
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
V0(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ (29)
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
V1(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ − V0(QI ; 0)− φ
and:
M0β1Q
β1−1
I =
dθ˜(QI)
dQI
[
V0(QI ; θ˜(QI))f(θ˜(QI))
]
(30)
+
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
V ′0(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ
−dθ˜(QI)
dQI
[
V1(QI ; θ˜(QI))f(θ˜(QI))
]
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
V ′1(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ − V ′0(QI ; 0)
Since by (17) V0(QI ; θ˜(QI)) = V1(QI ; θ˜(QI)), then (30) reduces to:
M0Q
β1
I =
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
QI
β1
V ′0(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
QI
β1
V ′1(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ −
QI
β1
V ′0(QI ; 0)
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Substituting in (29), we get:
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
V0(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
V1(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ − V0(QI ; 0)− φ
=
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
QI
β1
V ′0(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
QI
β1
V ′1(QI ; θ)f(θ)dθ −
QI
β1
V ′0(QI ; 0)
Substituting in for V0(QI ; θ) and V1(QI ; θ), and their derivatives gives:
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
[
A˜0(θ)Q
β1
I +
a+ (1 + θ)QI
r
]
f(θ)dθ
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
[
B˜1(θ)Q
γ2
I +
a
r
+
(1 + θ)QI
r − α −
c
r
]
f(θ)dθ
−
[
Aˆ0Q
β1
I +
a+QI
r
]
− φ
=
∫ θ˜(QI)
−1
QI
β1
[
A˜0(θ)β1Q
β1−1
I +
(1 + θ)
r
]
f(θ)dθ
+
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
QI
β1
[
B˜1(θ)γ2Q
γ2−1
I +
(1 + θ)
r − α
]
f(θ)dθ
−QI
β1
[
Aˆ0β1Q
β1−1
I +
1
r
]
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or:
αQI
r(r − α)
∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
(1 + θ)f(θ)dθ =
β1
β1 − 1
[
φ+
c
r
[
1− F (θ˜(QI))
]]
(31)
−β1 − γ2
β1 − 1
{∫ +1
θ˜(QI)
B˜1(θ)Q
γ2
I f(θ)dθ
}
Recall that the expression above should hold for QI < Qˆ. We can show
that if QI existed, it would belong to the interval ( Qˆ2 , Qˆ). This can be seen by
noting that if we look for QI that tends to Qˆ2 from above, i.e., θ˜(QI) ' +1, the
condition (31) is never satisfied. This means that, since the initial condition
Qˆ
2
< Q < Qˆ must be true whatever is the value of QI , it is never optimal
to acquire information about the true value of θ, i.e., Q < QI and thus
QI ∈ ( Qˆ2 , Qˆ). Note, however, the exception when the initial condition is
Q = Qˆ
2
and φ = 0 in which case QI would be undetermined.
Consider now the case when Q ≤ Qˆ
2
. Equation (27) becomes:
Eθ [V (Q; θ)]− V (Q; 0) =
∫ +1
−1
V0(Q; θ)f(θ)dθ − V0(Q; 0)
=
∫ +1
−1
[V0(Q; θ)− V0(Q; 0)]f(θ)dθ
Recalling that V0(Q; θ) = A˜0Qβ1 + a+(1+θ)Qr and V0(Q; 0) = A0Q
β1 + a+Q
r
, we
can writeEθ [V (Q; θ)]−V (Q; 0) = S(θ)Qβ1 , where S(θ) =
[∫ +1
−1 ∆A(θ)f(θ)dθ
]
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and ∆A = A˜0 − A0 is given by:
∆A(θ) = A˜0 − A0 =
[
nc
α
− Q˜
r
]
Q˜−β1
β1
−
[
nc
α
− Qˆ
r
]
Qˆ−β1
β1
and Q˜ = Qˆ
(1+θ)
. To find the constant and the optimal trigger QI we impose a
matching value condition and smooth pasting at QI .
M0Q
β1
I = S(θ)Q
β1
I − φ
and:
M0β1Q
β1−1
I = S(θ)β1Q
β1−1
I
Defining Y (Q) = [M0 − S(θ)]Qβ1 we should distinguish two cases:
1. S(θ) > 0. In this case there always exists a positive constant M0 such
that Y (Q) > 0, then maxY (Q)→ QI = Qˆ2 .
2. S(θ) < 0. In this case it is never optimal to invest. Q.E.D.
C Technical Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 4:
Assume Q < Qˆ. Recall that when Q is between 0 and Qˆ
2
, it is never
optimal to invest in quality. Next, consider the case when Qˆ
2
≤ Q < Qˆ. Recall
that Q, defined in Equation (3), is our stochastic process. We calculate the
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probability that a level Qˆ is hit starting from a generic starting value Qt.
Since
d ln[Qt] = µdt+ σdzt,
where µ = (α− 1
2
σ2), the probability Pr(Qτ = Qˆ | Qt) is given by (Cox and
Miller, 1965, p.212; Harrison, 1985, p. 43):
Pr
(
Qˆ, Q
)
=

1 if 2α
n
∑n
i=1 kit/σ
2 ≥ 1(
Qˆ
Q
)(2α
n
∑n
i=1 kit/σ
2)−1
if 2α
n
∑n
i=1 kit/σ
2 < 1
(32)
Starting at Q in the interior of the range (0, Qˆ], after a “sufficient” long
interval of time the process is sure to hit the trigger Qˆ if the trend is positive
and sufficiently large with respect to the uncertainty. However, if α
n
∑n
i=1 kit
is positive but low with respect to the uncertainty or it is negative, the
process may drift away and never hit Qˆ. Taking into account that the firms
never invest below Qˆ, applying the expression in (32) to Equation (22) with
α
n
∑n
i=1 kit = 0 we obtain:
∆(P (Q)) =
∫ θ˜(Q)
−1
(
Q
Q˜(θ)
)
f(θ)dθ +
∫ +1
θ˜(Q)
1f(θ)dθ −
(
Q
Qˆ
)
(33)
=
[
1− F (θ˜(Q))
] [
1−
(
Q
Qˆ
)]
+
(
Q
Qˆ
)∫ θ˜(Q)
−1
θf(θ)dθ
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We see that ∆(P ( Qˆ
2
)) = 0 and
∂∆(P (Q))
∂Q
=
(
1
Qˆ
)[∫ θ˜(Q)
−1
θf(θ)dθ −
[
1− F (θ˜(Q))
]]
< 0, for all
Qˆ
2
< Q < Qˆ .
Then Q = Qˆ
2
is the single root of Equation (33). Q.E.D.
46
